Nézőpontok

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 23.

"Tüntetések Budapesten."

Tartalom: "A tüntetések ezidáig békésnek bizonyultak - a gyülekezés elsődleges helye a Bem tér volt, ahol legalább tízezren gyűltek össze, mielőtt a Parlamenthez meneteltek. Nagy Imre beszédet mondott, és Gerő Ernő is beszél Jugoszláviából való hazatérése után. A diákok manifesztóját városszerte szétszórták, a követség is részesült egy példányban."

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Demonstrations in Budapest”. Confidential. 23 October 1956 | PRO.FO.371.122393

Demonstrations, peaceful so far, began in many parts of Budapest early this afternoon and are continuing. The national flag is much in evidence and national songs are being sung, while the slogans are mainly for solidarity with Poland and an independent foreign policy. The initial assembly point was the statue of – General Bem, the Polish Commander in the 1848 revolution in Hungary, where at least ten thousand gathered before marching to the Parliament building.

2. Such leadership as is discernible seems to come from the students with the assistance of the workers, although many of those marching in the columns of demonstrators are middle-aged, well-dressed people. So far from there being any military or police interference, both forces have been well represented among the demonstrators. Indeed, one column of about five hundred strong was composed solely of army officers singing national songs. On the insistence of the demonstrators, the national tricolor with Communist emblems was run up over Parliament building, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Security Police Headquarters and the main barracks.

3. Mr Imre Nagy has delivered an open-air speech to a large audience, but I regret that details of it are not yet available. It is understood that Gerő will broadcast tonight on his return from Yugoslavia.

4. My immediately following telegram contains translation of main points in a students’ manifesto which has been distributed wholesale throughout the city and is being acclaimed by the crowds. Copies were delivered at this Legation by students wearing Hungarian cockades.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 26.

"A Budapesti tüntetések anti-kommunistává válnak."

Tartalom: Túl korai még bármilyen következtetést levonni az elmúlt 24 óra eseményeinek kiváltó okairól és várható következményeiről. Az viszont világos, hogy ami békés tüntetésnek indult, hamar minden másnál erősebb anti-kommunista és oroszellenes megmozdulássá vált, és habár elsőként a Műegyetem diákjai lobbantották lángra, a tüntetők a lakosság minden szegletéből érkeztek.

Továbbá ésszerű feltételeznünk, hogy a diákok által kezdeményezett felkelés oka a lengyelországi fejlemények voltak, és annak a ténye hogy Gerő hatalmát, aki nem kevésbé népszerűtlen mint Rákosi, az orosz vezérekkel való krími tárgyalást követően megerősítették.

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Budapest demonstration turns anti-communist”. Confidential. 26 October 2025 | PRO.FO.371.122374.NH.1011086

It is too soon to offer any very firm comments on the immediate causes and likely results of events here during the last 24 hours. But at least it is clear that what were designed as orderly peaceful demonstrations quickly became more anti-Communist and anti-Russian than anything else; and that the demonstrators, although it was students of the Technical University who touched off the spark, ended by being drawn from virtually all sections of the community. Our publicity will, no doubt, emphasize that the workers of Csepel Island factories, those whom the Communists might have hoped would be the last to desert, were among the most militant and numerous of the demonstrators. The duration and intensity of the fighting testifies, moreover, to the strength and determination of those opposing the régime. Finally, Russian intervention – Warsaw Treaty or no – can hardly commend itself to opinion anywhere outside the Soviet bloc.

2. Beyond that, it is reasonable to suppose that the students who started the affair were prompted by recent developments in Poland, coupled with some apprehension that Gerő, who is hardly less unpopular than Rakosi, had been confirmed in power following his talks with the Russian leaders in the Crimea, and Tito in Belgrade. To what extent supporters of Imre Nagy encouraged the students, if at all, is impossible to guess. But Nagy himself cannot have doubted the inevitability of his early return to important office and, although his prior knowledge and connivance in the initial demonstrations must be certain, he, therefore cannot have wished matters to go anything like as far as they. As things are, he can hardly hope to overcome the popular conviction that he shares responsibility for bringing Russian forces into Budapest, even though Gerő may well have asked for them before Nagy joined the leadership.

3. At all events, Nagy is now Prime Minister and Gerő remains First Secretary, a sharing of power broadly reflected in the new Politburo. How long this ill-assorted pair can run in double harness seems problematical. 

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 25.

"A magyarországi helyzetről."

Tartalom: A kommunista emblémával ellátott magyar trikolór sok középületen leng városszerte, míg a rendezett sorokban menetelők hazafias dalokat énekelnek és szabadon mozognak a városon belül. De a veszteségek igen súlyosak, még a nők és gyermekek között is, és a népesség a tömeges megtorlástól tart. Egyértelműen a kommunizmus elleni lázadás sikere forog kockán - és ahogy látom, nagyszerű lehetőségünk van, hogy eldöntsük sorsukat. Nem indokolt hát, hogy a helyzetet az ENSZ elé terjesszük, és tetteinknek a lehető legnagyobb publicitást nyerjünk?

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“On the situation in Hungary”. Confidential. 25 October 1956 | PRO.FO.371.122376.NH.1011089

The Hungarian Tricolours without the Communist emblem, now flying on many public and other buildings throughout the city, while orderly crowds carrying their flags and signing patriotic songs are moving about at will. Without controlling their Government they appear to have as close to controlling Budapest as is ever likely.

2. But the casualties have been very severe, even amongst the women and children, and the populace are terrified of massive reprisals. The success of this revolt against Communism is clearly in the balance and, as I see it, we have a magnificent opportunity to tip the scales. Is there not justification for placing the situation at once before the United Nations, giving the widest possible publicity to our action? The mere fact of our application would be beneficial?

3. But you will already have considered the possibilities open to Her Majesty’s Government. I would therefore offer only my impression that the fleeting moment is here.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 27.

"Brit intézkedések a magyar nép megsegítésére."

Tartalom: Egy ideje azon gondolkodom, hogy milyen praktikus lépéseket tehetünk, hogy a magyarokkal való együttérzésünket kifejezzük és hogy a propaganda-lehetőségeket kihasználjuk. Két alapelvet kell figyelembe vennünk: 1) semmit sem tehetünk, amely azt a feltételezést erősítené meg, hogy katonai segítség érkezne; 2) bármi, amit teszünk, most kell hogy történjen, amíg az ellenállás tart.

Úgy tartom, ezeknek az alapelveknek megfelelnénk, amennyiben a nyugati hatalmak felajánlanák egy gyógyszerből és élelemből álló konvoj indítását Ausztriából Budapestre.  Mindkettőre rettentően nagy szükség van, bár egy ilyen ajánlatot egészen biztosan elutasítanának a kommunista vezetők, nem lehetne félreérteni, és hamis illúziót sem keltene. Ezzel szemben elutasítása nagyon jól mutatná a kommunisták érdektelenségét a magyar nép jólétével szemben. 

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“British measures to help Hungarian people”. Confidential.
27 October 2025 | PRO.FO.371.122377.NH.10110/116

I have been considering what practical steps we might take to demonstrate sympathy for the Hungarian people and to exploit propaganda opportunities. There seems to be two fundamental principles:

1) we must do nothing to encourage the idea that military support might be forthcoming; and
2) anything we do must be done at once, while resistance continues.

2. These would be met, I think, if the Western Powers were to offer to send immediately a convoy of food and medical supplies from the Austrian border to Budapest. Both are badly needed and such an offer, though almost certain to be rejected by the Communist leaders, could neither be misconstrued nor encourage false hopes. Rejection would enable us to demonstrate the indifference of the Communists to the welfare of the Hungarian people. Acceptance, unlikely though it is, would have obvious practical advantages which I need to enumerate. In either event, the Russians will probably make some such gesture and there is much to be said for getting in first.

3. If you are prepared to consider such an offer, which to be effective propaganda would necessarily have to relate to a substantial quantity, I suggest that it should be broadcast direct and frequently to the Hungarian Government. I should naturally try to transmit it officially, but the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has for some days appeared to be closed.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 29. 

"A brit nemzetiségűek lehetséges evakuálása."

A családok, nélkülözhetetlen alkalmazottak és brit nemzetiségűek evakuálásának lehetőségét folyamatosan szem előtt tartjuk. De az oroszokkal szembeni elhúzódó ellenállás előre nem volt látható, és ezidáig okosabbnak bizonyult nyugton maradnunk, minthogy ilyen sok embert a város ennyi pontjáról elmozdítsunk. ... Attól függetlenül, hogy engedélyt kapok-e a hatóságoktól, úgy tervezem, hogy megpróbálom a nőket és gyerekeket a pesti épületben összegyűjteni. Az épület erős, rendelkezünk ellátmánnyal, és a pince (ahol alternatív rádió kapcsolatot is kiépítettünk) megfelelő lesz. Bár a művelet kockázatos, a hangulatunknak is kedvező lesz, hogy mind egy fedél alatt vagyunk.

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Possible evacuation of British subjects”. Confidential.
29 October 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122380

The possibility that we should have to evacuate families, non-essential staff and British subjects has been constantly in mind. But this prolonged resistance to the Russians could hardly have been foreseen, and hitherto it has been wiser to sit tight than to attempt to move so many people from so many parts of the city. The problem is complicated by the fact that the majority of our scattered British community are elderly women, with most of whom it has been completely impossible to keep in touch.

2. I am much disturbed now by the rapid spread of fighting in Buda where relatively little open ground will give greater scope for artillery fire and the houses this afford less cover. Moreover, there are increasing reports of indiscriminate Russian firing everywhere. It seems possible that the Russians are trying, or will try to force matters to a conclusion before the Security Council proceedings can get far. Hungarian resistance would be stimulated by them.

3. After informing my United States colleague (who is considering the same problem) and with the unanimous approval of my senior staff, I have therefore sought an interview as soon as possible with the Minister of Foreign Affairs or his deputy to discuss this question. Unfortunately, the only official with whom I can establish contact is junior and, although well-disposed, his ability to arrange anything quickly is doubtful.

4. Whether or not I can contact or gain assistance from the authorities I intend to try in the first phase to concentrate the women and children of the staff at the Chancery premises in Pest. The building is solid, we have provisions here and the basement (in which we have set up alternative wireless arrangements) will be adequate. Another important consideration is that, although some risks may be run in the course of this concentration, moral – which I do not need to say is high – will be sustained by our all being under one roof.

5. Whether it would then be desirable to try to get a convoy of British subjects through to Vienna can be decided only in the light of circumstances. The main road might well be impassable at any point and side roads in this country are hazardous to say the least. It might, therefore, be preferable to make either for the Czech frontier at Szob, or for Subotica in Yugoslavia. But where ever the convoy headed perhaps its greatest difficulty would be to extricate itself from Budapest.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 30.

"Mikoyan látogatása Magyarországon."

Tartalom: A város kedélye megint csúnyára fordult, és a harcok újra elharapóztak. A rezsim bejelentését, mely szerint a forradalmárok fegyverletételét követően az oroszok 24 órán belül visszavonulnak nem szabad kész ténynek vennünk. Én ebben kételkedem, és egészen biztos vagyok benne, hogy addig amíg ebben a városban orosz erők vannak, az ellenségeskedés sem fog alábbhagyni. ... Ha az oroszok szeretnék ezt az országot a kommunizmus uralma alatt tartani, erősítést kell küldeniük, és még erősebb elnyomást kell gyakorolniuk. De elképzelhető, hogy nem hajlandóak szembenézni ezzel a lehetőséggel, ez esetben azonnal vissza kell vonulniuk, bár ez (ahogyan ezt látniuk kell) minden bizonnyal a rezsim összeomlásához vezet. ... Ezeket feltételezve a feladatunk annak elősegítése, hogy az oroszok presztízsveszteség nélkül visszavonulhassanak, látszólag a jelenlegi magyar rezsim kérésére, anélkül, hogy úgy tűnjön, hogy anti-kommunista magyarok űzték volna ki őket.

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Mikoyan’s visit to Hungary”. Confidential.
30 October 2024 | PRO.FO.378.122378.NH.10110/172

The fighting reported in paragraph one of my telegram No. 489 is still in progress.

2. The temper of the city again looks ugly, and fighting may well spread throughout it once more. The régime announcement that the Russians would withdraw within twenty four hours of the Nationalists handing over their arms to the Hungarian Army may conceivably be accepted at its face value. But I doubt it, and am reasonably certain that there can be no genuine cessation of hostilities in the city while any Russian force remains here. Without their withdrawal no political concession offered by the present régime will appease the Nationalists; and existing Russian forces seemingly overwhelming have not yet succeeded In partly expending them. The position in the rest of the country is known to you.

3. If, therefore, the Russians are determined to keep this country Communist, they will have to send in reinforcements and embark on an even more drastic campaign of repression. But they may be unwilling to face this prospect, if only for the future of Communism in uncommitted countries and elsewhere; in that event the logical alternative would be to withdraw at once, even though (as they surely must recognise) this would almost certainly involve the régime’s collapse.

4. I do not exclude other possibilities, but these may have been the alternatives facing Mikoyan when, as reliably reported, he arrived in Budapest yesterday. (I now hear he left this morning). If so, the decisive factor influencing the Russians may be their prestige rather than the fate of the Hungarian régime, which Russians must now regard as impotent and unreliable.

5. On this assumption, our problem is to devise a face-saving formula that will permit Russian forces to withdraw, ostensibly at the request of the present Hungarian régime, without their appearing to have been turned out by anti-Communist Hungarian people.

6. I cannot pretend to offer an answer to this problem, which may well be under consideration already. My purpose in raising it is simply to emphasize its importance. If we can get the Russians out, the Hungarians may safely be left to settle their own destiny; it will not be Communism. I would suggest, therefore, that, whatever negotiating position we adopt, the vital point to be secured is the withdrawal from Hungary of all Soviet armed forces. 

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 31.

"A budapesti hangulatról."

Tartalom: A budapesti hangulatot óvatos várakozás jellemzi és folyamatos készültség. Miután feltették azt a kérdést fegyverzett civil járőröknek, hogy elfogadnák-e Nagy Imrét kormányfőnek, azt válaszolták "Mi nem vagyunk senkiért sem. Arra várunk, hogy meglássuk, mi történik." ... Az orosz erők visszavonulása kell, hogy legfőbb és folyamatos célunk legyen, és amennyiben ezt nem tudjuk garantálni, mindent meg kell tennünk azért, hogy azokat az ígéreteket, amelyeket most Nagy Imre kommunista miniszterelnök tett a magyaroknak, az utolsó betűig betartsák."

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“On the spirit of Budapest”. Confidential.
31 October 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122379

The spirit of Budapest now seems to be that of cautious expectancy, with no (repeat no) dropping of guard. For example, an armed civilian patrol (please see paragraph 4 of telegram under reference), when asked whether they would accept Mr Nagy as leader of the Government, replied “we are for no one. We are waiting to see what happens”. In the villages just beyond the city my Military Attaché reports that the former political parties are already reorganizing themselves.

2. I am not competent to offer suggestions on tactics in the United Nations. But I would say (a) that the withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Hungary must be our main and constant objective; and (b) that if we cannot secure this, we should do all we can to ensure that promises now being broadcast to the Hungarian people by their Communist Prime Minister Mr Nagy, be kept to the letter (cf. my telegrams No 510 and 518).

3. If it were all possible to obtain some form of United Nations supervision of either (a) or (b), possibly in context of Assembly discussion of 1950 [sic.], or at the worst a continuing interest in developments here, so very much the better.

4. Although the thought may at this stage seem altogether premature, I would add that neutrality on the Austrian pattern might perhaps suit this country (and us). 

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 31.

"A Rádió épületénél történt eseményekről, Budapesten."

Tartalom: Október 23-án 18 órakor a Bem téren összegyűlt tömeg a Parlament épülete elé vonult, ahol jelmondatokat skandáltak és Nagy megjelenését követelték. Tipikusan olyan felkiáltások hangzottak el, mint "le Gerővel", "le Rákosival", "le a Sztálin szoborral", "ki az oroszokkal". Ez a tömeg egészen este 8 utánig a Parlament előtt maradt. Nyolckor Gerő beszédét sugározta a rádió, majd Nagy Imre szólt a tömeghez, kérve őket hogy bízzanak benne és rendezetten vonuljanak el. Kérése nem került meghallgatásra, és a tömeg a Sztálin tér felé vonult. 

A Sztálin szobor ledöntése nagyságrendileg két és fél órába telt és 9.25 körül fejeződött be. Ez a tömeg, felvillanyozva a történtektől, a Rádió épületénél csatlakozott az ott lévő gyülekezethez. Eközben a rádió épületénél a következők történtek. 6 óráig bezárólag egy csapat ávós vette be magát az épületbe. Kicsivel 7.30 után egy küldöttség megpróbált bejutni az épületbe, hogy a diákok 14 pontját felolvashassák. Erre Gerő beszéde után került csak sor, jóval 8 óra után. Mire végül bejutottak, a rádió hatósága beleegyezett, hogy a 14 pontból néhányat beolvassanak. A tömeg azonban, amely Gerő beszédének hallatán felbőszült, a teljes manifesztót követelte. 9 óra körül egy újabb 80 fős küldöttség nyert bebocsátást az épületbe, és az ÁVH is erősítést kapott. Ami ezt követően történt, már kideríthetetlen, azonban egy ÁVH őr lelőtte a küldöttség egy tagját, amely a küldöttséget visszavonulásra kényszerítette.

A hírek futótűzként terjedtek a tömegben és elszabadultak az indulatok. Az ÁVH először könnygázzal próbálta oszlatni a tömeget, majd belelőtt, megölve 3 embert. A tömeg pillanatnyilag visszavonult, majd újult erővel támadta az épületet - megállított egy teherautót annak reményében hogy ÁVH embereit találja benne, majd egy mentőautót, amelyben lőszereket találtak. A rendőrség teherautóját is megállították, kiszállásra kényszerítették a rendőrőket és felgyújtották. 

Nem tudni pontosan mikor érkezett az ÁVH 300 fős erősítése, de már legalább 10 óra volt. Azonnal elkezdtek tüzelni, 8 ember halálát okozva. 

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Events at the Radio Building, Budapest”. Confidential.
31 October 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122379.NH.10110/203

The opening phase of the revolution down to 6.00 p.m. on October 23 was fully described in my telegram No. 404.

2. At that time the crowds had moved from Bem Square to the Parliament buildings where they remained  shouting slogans and demanding the appearance of Nagy. Typical slogans were “down with Gerő”, “down with Rákosi”, “down with the Stalin statue”, “out with the Russians”. This crowd remained in Parliament Square until well after 8 p.m. At eight p.m. Mr Gerő made his broadcast speech, as described in my telegram No. 408, and subsequently Mr Nagy addressed the crowd requesting them to have confidence in him and to disperse in an orderly manner. His appeal had no effect and the crowd then moved off in the direction of Stalin Square.

3. The crowd had already been gathering in that Square since about 7 p.m. and also at radio building. The task of pulling down the Stalin statue took almost two and a half hours and was completed only at about 9.25 p.m. This crowd, in high good humour, then moved off to join crowd already at Radio building.

4. Meanwhile, at radio station the following event had taken place. By 6 p.m. a squad of A.V.H. police had taken up positions inside the radio building. Soon after 7.30, when people began to gather there, a deputation from the crowd attempted to enter the building to demand that students’ 14 Point Resolution (please see my telegram No. 405) should be broadcast. In fact, the deputation were unable to gain entry until after Gerő had made his speech at 8 p.m. When finally they got in, the radio Authorities agreed that some of the points in the manifesto should be broadcast. This was announced to the crowd by the deputation who appeared on the balcony of the building. The demonstrators, who had already been informed of the gist of Gerő’s uncompromising speech, were already getting angry and demanded that all points should be broadcast. About 9 p.m. a further delegation of about eighty people succeeded in gaining entry to the building and at the same time some A.V.H. reinforcements arrived.

5. Precisely what happened next will probably never be known, but it is clear that A.V.H. guard inside the hall shot one member of the deputation, who were compelled to withdraw in confusion.

6. The news of the murder spread through the crowd at once and tempers broke. Students climbed the scaffolding in order to try to enter the building. The A.V.H. at first attempted to scatter the crowd with tear gas. When this failed they fired a volley killing three people.

7. The crowd withdrew temporarily, but returned to the attack and attempted to batter down the door. At this point a lorry drove up and was attacked by the crowd in the belief that the men inside were A.V.H. reinforcements, an approaching ambulance was also stopped and found to contain ammunition. Next an approaching lorry belonging to normal city police appeared, was stopped by the crowd demonstrating, emptied of the men inside it and burnt.

8. It is not clear at exactly what time considerable A.V.H. reinforcement (about three hundred) arrived, but it must have been nearly 10 p.m. when six or seven large lorries appeared at radio building each carrying between twenty and thirty men armed with tommy guns. Firing from A.V.H. opened almost at once and it is reported that eight more people were killed at this stage. Shooting continued and at this time some of the demonstrators must have obtained arms.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 31.

"Tankok a Rádiónál, Budapest."

Tartalom: A magyar katonaság tankjai este 10.15 körül érkeztek a helyszínre, majd a városba hajtottak a rádió épületéhez. A tetejük nyitva volt és vezetőik a tömegekkel szimpatizáltak, semmilyen erőfeszítést nem téve arra hogy a rendet helyreállítsák. Négy tank elérte a rádió épületét, majd az épp szolgáló ezredes megpróbált az épületben lévő ÁVH és a tüntetők között közvetíteni. Őt és egy tiszttársát is lelőtte az ÁVH. A tüntetők ezután fegyverhez jutottak a városi rendőrség, katonák és munkások által vezetett fegyvert és lőszert szállító teherautók révén, és heves harcok törtek ki. ... Hajnali 4.30 körül a teljes orosz páncélos hadoszlop bevonult a városba a Balatoni út felől,  ahol erődemonstrációval próbáltak rendet teremteni. Először nem tüzeltek, de ekkorra már végképp elharapózott a helyzet. A harcok, lövöldözés és géppuskaropogás egész éjjel folytatódott, bár reggel 7 és 9 között némi csend állt be, 9.15-től újra heves harcok csaptak fel.

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Tanks at the Radio Building, Budapest”. Confidential.
31 October 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122379.NH.10110/204

The Hungarian Army tanks appeared on the scene about 10.15 p.m., then drove into the city and made for the radio building. Their hatches were open and the crews fraternised with the crowd making no attempt to restore order. Four tanks in fact reached the radio building and the Colonel in command attempted to mediate between A.V.H. inside the building and demonstrators. He and another officer were shot down by the A.V.H.

2. Thereafter the demonstrators rapidly acquired additional arms and ammunition. Individual Hungarian soldiers and city police handed their weapons to the demonstrators and ammunition trucks driven by workers appeared. Some sore of ammunition dump was set up in the neighbourhood of the radio building from which demonstrators were quickly able to replenish their stocks.

3. Following outburst of serious fighting at the radio building a further crowd moved on to the offices of Szabad Nep, the Party paper, where A.V.H. men again fired on the crowd. Fighting thereafter spread and the sound of firing went on throughout the night.

4. At 4.30 a.m. the main Russian armoured column entered the town along Balaton Road, drove straight into Pest, where they tried at first to restore order by a display of force. They did not open fire straight away. The situation, however, was by this time out of hand and Russian forces were soon in action. Bursts of machine gun fire were continuous and, although there was a lull between 7 and 9 a.m., by 9.15 very heavy firing had started once more. The subsequent course of events has been fully described in my telegrams.

5. The above account of outbreak of revolution is based on reports of several reliable eye-witnesses. Much of it can be directly confirmed by member of my staff.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. november 1.

"Nagy bejelenti Magyarország semlegességét."

Tartalom: Épp most idéztek be sürgősen a magyar külügyminisztériumba és közölték velem, hogy szovjet csapatok érkeznek Kárpátalja felől. Nagy, aki külügyminiszteri hatáskörben tevékenykedik, azonnali távozásukat követelte és bejelentette, hogy a magyar kormány megtagadja a Varsói Szerződést, és hogy az ország semleges. Mint később kiderült, az általa továbbított note verbale az ENSZ felé is bejelentette ezen igényét és a négy nagy hatalom védelmét kérte Magyarország semlegességének biztosításában.

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Nagy’s proclamation of Hungarian neutrality”. Confidential.
1 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122379.NH.10110/223

I have just been called urgently to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was told that new Soviet forces were entering Hungary from sub-Carpathia. Mr Imre Nagy, President of the Council of Ministers, acting in his capacity of Minister of Foreign Affairs, had made a vigorous protest against this to the Russian Ambassador. He had demanded the immediate removal of these troops and had declared that the Hungarian Government were withdrawing from the Warsaw Treaty and proclaiming the neutrality of their country. The Soviet Ambassador had undertaken to transmit this message to his Government and to seek an immediate answer. Mr Nagy, the official went on, was about to broadcast this news to the nation. Meanwhile, he wished me to be given a note verbale for transmission to Her Majesty’s Government.

I was then handed the Note, which was in French. It went beyond what I had so far been told, in that it said that the Hungarian Government were addressing themselves to the United Nations organization and asked for the aid of the four Great Powers in defence of Hungary’s neutrality.

This, I was told, meant a guarantee of the kind given to Austria.

3. [sic] Full text of the note verbale is given in my immediately succeeding telegram.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. november 1.

"Helyzet Magyarországon."

Tartalom: ... Nagy Imre (aki miniszterelnökként és külügyminiszterként is tevékenykedik a Minisztérium informális tájékoztatása szerint) bejelentette, hogy az oroszokkal már elkezdődtek a tárgyalások a szovjet csapatok kivonásával kapcsolatosan és Magyarország Varsói Szerződés megtagadásával kapcsolatban. ...

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Situation in Hungary”. Confidential.
1 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122379.NH.10110/228

In present confused circumstances it is impossible to say how representative my “partisan” visitors' views are of assessed strength and unity of his associates. But certainly these views differ in one significant point from those expressed by Jozsef Dudas, the head of nationalist committee which is in administrative control of the city. Dudas, it seems, is ready to have Nagy and Kadar in a caretaker government, which would prepare the way for free elections, provided it included adequate nationalist representation. Presumably with that in view, Colonel Maleter (see paragraph 2 of my telegram No. 506) has been appointed Senior Deputy Minister of Defence. He is a nationalist Communist.

2. Meanwhile, Nagy (who is acting, I am told informally by Ministry, as Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as Prime Minister) has announced that negotiations with the Russians have already begun on withdrawal of Soviet troops and Hungary’s repudiation of her obligations under the Warsaw Treaty. I understand that he is also negotiating with the Social Democrats and about to have talks with Bela Kovacs also. Both seem willing to accept him as temporary head of caretaker coalition government if he will guarantee the holding of free elections.

3. To complicate matters, in several parts of the country there are nationalist organizations in control, but so far without objective policy. The exception is the “Trans-Danubian National Council” which combines several nationalist committees in Western Hungary. (I should explain that to Hungarians the word “Trans-Danubia” means Western Hungary). And there is now Cardinal Mindszenty to be reckoned with; his authority will certainly be considerable.

4. In the next few days therefore much will depend on whether:

(a) the various nationalist councils and other organizations decide to set up a single directing body chosen solely from amongst themselves (i.e. a quasi-military dictatorship) or prefer to accept a caretaker coalition government;

(b) the system under leaders such as Nagy and Kadar succeeds as they are undoubtedly attempting, in taking over leadership of the revolution.

5. From our point of view there would appear to be two dangers threatening Hungary. The first is that the fervent nationalist (my “partisan” visitor) by refusing any collaboration with the Communist might plunge the country into anarchy, risking renewed Russian intervention. The second is that, in their anxiety to restore ordered government and to negotiate a quick Russian withdrawal from this country, anti Communists might accept a coalition government which despite inclusion of respectable names would leave, at least temporarily, Communists with a preponderance of power.

6. I remain convinced, however, that if Russian forces go, Communists will sooner or later follow. If that is right, first danger is the greater.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. október 31.

"Nagy bejelenti a magyarok semlegességét."

Tartalom:  Mióta elkezdtem ezt a táviratot diktálni, a Budapest Rádió tett egy bejelentést a bejelentéssel kapcsolatban, hozzáfűzve, hogy az ENSZ felé is minden itteni külképviselet felé kommunikálták. ... Nagy maga jelentette be a hírt három órával a külügyminisztériumban tett látogatásom után. Meglepő módon nem számolt be az orosz csapatok mozgásáról és az ez ellen való tiltakozásáról. Nyugodt hangon jelentette be Magyarország semlegességét és minden országot arra kért, hogy ezt tartsa tiszteletben. 

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Hungarian neutrality declared by Nagy”. Confidential.
1 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122379.NH.10110/226

Since I began dictating this series of telegrams, Budapest Radio has made an announcement in terms of the Note, adding that it had been communicated to the United Nations Organization and to all Missions here. In fact, however, Note appears to have been given so far only to the Americans, French, Yugoslavs and myself.

2. Mr Nagy himself broadcast about three hours after my visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Surprisingly, he said nothing about Russian troop movements and his protest against them. Speaking in a calm voice, he proclaimed Hungarian neutrality and asked that all countries should respect it. Hungary would not join any bloc; she was now independent and neutral; and he begged Hungarian people to return to their senses. Cardinal Mindszenty broadcast shortly afterwards. After praising the achievements of this country’s youth, he said he would examine the grave situation in which Hungary found herself and speak again two days hence.

3. Neither broadcast was consistent with gravity of the Note, a discrepancy I cannot at present explain. But whatever the explanation, the fact is that the present government of this country have withdrawn from the Warsaw Treaty, have informed the United Nations of Hungary’s neutrality and have asked that it be guaranteed by the four Great Powers. Should not the Security Council take up this renewed Soviet intervention, which the Russians cannot represent as being at the request of Hungarian Government or justified by the Warsaw Treaty? Alternatively, is there any prospect of the General Assembly considering the issue urgently and either requesting the Secretary General to investigate it or send a commission of enquiry?

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. november 2.

"A helyzet Magyarországon."

Tartalom: A város csendes maradt, néhol lövöldözés hallatszott késő délután amely minden bizonnyal az ÁVH vadászat része.

Észak-keleten az orosz erők elfoglalták Nyíregyháza vasúti állomását, Vecsés felől pedig egy hosszú orosz konvoj indult keletre. ... Nem kaptam még hírt a külügyminisztériumból kérésemre, hogy azonnal értesítsenek Nagy Imre tiltakozásával kapcsolatos orosz válaszra. 

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Situation in Hungary”. Confidential.
2 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122380

The city remains quiet, and the little firing was heard in late afternoon was almost certainly no more than part of A.V.H. hunt.

2. In the north east of the country a Russian force is reported to have occupied railway station at Nyiregyhaza and to be defending the railway line thence to the Russian frontier. A large convoy of Russian lorries, guarded by tanks moved eastward this afternoon through Vecses. On the Austrian side of Gyor a Russian force is across the road to Vienna and drawing closer to the frontier. According to nationalist sources, Soviet bombers have flown towards the south of the country, where at least two airfields, Szeged and Kecskemet, are in Russian hands.

3. Mikoyan is alleged to be here again; and from Mr Nagy’s broadcast this evening it seems that the Russians are ignoring his suggestion that a joint commission should be set up to consider the introducing of the withdrawal of their forces. Meanwhile the old political parties in this country are trying to reorganize.

4. I have had no response yet from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to my request to be informed at once of Russian reply to Mr Nagy’s protest (paragraph i of my telegram Nr. 536). Indeed, telephone call to Ministry this afternoon failed to obtain an answer. Possibly this was because a sharp skirmish is reliably reported to have occurred there between nationalists and some members of A.V.H. who had taken refuge in the top storey of the building.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. november 4.

"A Követség mint menekülttábor."

Tartalom: A Nemzetközösség állampolgárait, a magyar dolgozók családjait és a saját belföldi dolgozóinkat érkezési sorrendben veszem be. Az esetlegesen megjelenő sebesülteket is be fogom fogadni. Más magyarok is kérelmezték menekültként való befogadásukat, nevezetesen egy csoport kiváló író. Legnagyobb sajnálatomra el kell hogy utasítsam őket annak ismeretében, hogy ellátmányunk végén járunk, és semmilyen körülmények között sem állhatok ellen egy esetleges orosz felszólításnak, hogy a Követség épületében meghúzódókat kiadjam. 

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“The Legation as a refugee shelter”. Confidential.
4 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122330.NH.10110/226

I am taking into the Legation such Commonwealth citizens, families of Hungarian staff and members of our domestic staff as are presenting themselves. I shall also take in any wounded who may appear.

2. A number of appeals for refuge by other Hungarians, notably a group of distinguished writers are being made to me. With the utmost reluctance, I am refusing them on the grounds that we are already nearing the end of our provisions and that I should not in any event be able to resist a Russian demand to surrender those taking shelter here.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. november 7.

"Heves harcok Budapesten."

Tartalom: Egy megbízható nyugati megfigyelő, akinek sikerült átjutnia a város egy részén, az alábbi jelentést adta nekem: A Duna mentén az orosz páncélosok koncentráltan vannak jelen a Honvédelmi Minisztérium és Parlament épületeinél, Pest központjában és a Sztálin téren. Pest négy főutcája mentén keserves harcok folynak, ahol barikádok és kilőtt orosz tankok fékezik meg a további orosz támadásokat. A Palota és Imperial Hotel és a környező épületek lángokban állnak. ... Ez és más jelentések megerősítik korábbi távirataimban kifejtett meggyőződésemet, hogy addig, amíg az ENSZ közbe nem lép vagy az oroszok vissza nem vonulnak, folytatódni fognak a harcok. Az összes forrás szerint a magyarok öngyilkos bátorságnak adnak tanúbizonyságot, és a végsőkig kitartanak.

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Heavy fighting in Budapest”. Confidential.
7 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122383.NH.10110/371

A reliable Western observer, who managed to get through part of the city this morning, has just given me the following report (1.30 p.m. local time).

2. There are large concentrations of Russian armour along the Danube, around the Ministry of Defence and Parliament building and in the centre of Pest at Stalin Square. Bitter fighting is in progress throughout the length of the four main streets of Pest, where barricades and destroyed Russian tanks are impeding further Soviet attacks. The Palace and Imperial Hotels, together with the surrounding houses, are in flames.

3. Heavy fighting is also going on in the Var area of Buda, which is practically destroyed. The Soilert Hill region, until last night the scene of intensive fighting, is now firmly in Russian hands and Nationalists there have been annihilated. Resistance in the Thokoly area has also been eliminated at last.

4. Many of the Russian prisoners in Nationalist hands are Ukrainians and Armenians, I was told, and Hungarian boys of 12 years of age were seen carrying arms for the Nationalist forces. The Russian tanks in some localities appeared to be disorganized and were firing wildly. Other tank units were foraging in the country-side for food. A detachment of Russian infantry had been seen last night, (this is the first reliable report I have had of their presence).

5. This and other reports strengthen the conviction expressed in paragraph 2 of my telegram 597; until there is United Nations intervention or the Russians withdraw, fighting will undoubtedly continue. All accounts agree that the Hungarians are displaying suicidal bravery and are determined to resist to the end. Meanwhile, it is now reasonably certain that the Kadar “Government” is in Szolnok (see paragraph 4 of my telegram 609). 

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. november 3.

"Az oroszok viselkedése Magyarországon."

Tartalom: Egy utánpótlást szállító, magyar Vöröskeresztes autóban ülő két orvos és nővér az alábbi információt adták: 

A magyarok soha nem fogják elfogadni Kádárt és az úgynevezett kormányát. A Nacionalisták tudják, hogy az amnesztia feltételeit nem fogják betartani, és ezért kevesen adják meg magukat. ... Egy szovjet páncélos hadtestet irányító százados azt kérdezte, hol talál egy Nacionalista parancsnokot, akinek megadhatja magát és csapatának maradványát. Három magyar kisfiú ugyanis molotov koktéllal hatástalanította tankjaikat, bár mindhármújukat agyonlőtték a cselekedet közben. Ez meggyőzte őt és embereit, hogy a magyar ellenállás oly mélyről fakadó, hogy nem fognak ellene küzdeni. ... 

Az orosz sebesültek nem hajlandóak elhagyni harckocsijaikat hogy orosz kézen lévő kórházakba menjenek, mivel ha elhagyják a tankokat, lelövetik őket. Az orosz parancsok szerint semmilyen körülmények között nem hagyhatják el harckocsijaikat.  

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Russian behaviour in Hungary”. Confidential.
3 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122385.NH.10110/408

A Hungarian Red Cross car has just brought supplies to Her Majesty’s Legation from the Austrian Legation Red Cross stores. I see no reason whatever to doubt the following information given to me by the two doctors and nurses who manned it:

The Hungarian people would never accept Kadar and his so-called Government. The Nationalists know that the amnesty terms would not be observed, and few therefore would surrender.
A Soviet aircraft had come to Budapest yesterday bringing with it “important Russians”.

The captain commanding a detachment of Soviet tanks, which our visitors had encountered some days ago, had asked them where he might find a responsible Nationalist Commander to whom to surrender what was left of his unit. He explained that three small Hungarian boys had put some of his tanks out of action with bottles of lighted petrol, though each in turn was shot down in the act of throwing these primitive weapons. This had convinced him that Hungarian resistance sprang from something so fundamental that he and his men would not go on fighting it.
Red Cross Headquarters and several hospitals had been severely damaged by Russian firing. At the gates of one hospital a crowd of civilians seeking sanctuary had been shot down by Russian tanks. Russian tanks guarding another street had fired on the Red Cross workers attempting to succour the wounded; eventually the workers threw ropes to those wounded who could grasp them and be pulled beyond the tank.

Russian wounded were refusing to return to their units and even to go to hospitals in Russian hands, since they knew that they would be shot for having left their tanks; Russian orders were that in no circumstances was a man to get out of his vehicle.

See my immediately following telegram.

Távirat Leslie Fry-tól Budapestről a Brit Külügyminisztérium számára - 1956. november 9.

"Keserves harcok Magyarországon."

Tartalom: Buda keserves harcok színtere volt ma reggel, de ott is és a Csepel-szigeten is ahol hatalmas tűz lángol, úgy tűnik, alábbhagynak a harcok. A kezdetben szervezetlenül és fegyvermentesnek indult forradalom oroszok általi leverése legalább akkora károkat okozott Budapestnek, mint egy ellenséges erők közti nagyobb összecsapás. A város számos területe romokban hever, kevés az érintetlen környék. Mindenhol üvegtörmeléket látni, és most a tél beköszöntével a lakók maradékának már nemcsak az éhséggel, hanem a hideg okozta nehézségekkel is szembe kell nézniük. Az emberek meglepően rendületlenek. Mindenhol a kommunista jelkép nélküli, lyukas nemzeti zászló leng, még a Vörös Csillag helyén is, melyet a háborús emlékműről döntöttek le.

***

TELEGRAM FROM MR FRY, BUDAPEST TO FOREIGN OFFICE

“Bitter fighting in Hungary”. Confidential.
9 November 2024 | PRO.FO.371.122335.NH.10110/740

Buda was the scene of some bitter fighting this morning but both there and on Csepel Island, where a large fire is blazing, fighting seems now to have ceased (5 p.m. local time).

2. The Russian suppression of a revolt, begun without organisation and without arms has cost Budapest almost as much damage as would have been caused by a major battle between opposing armies. Many areas of the city have been devastated, and few have been untouched. Glass lies everywhere and now, with the onset of winter, what remains of the population faces hardship not only from hunger, but from cold. Since so many industrial areas have been badly affected the task of reconstruction cannot be quick.

3.  The people are splendidly uncowed. The national flag, with the Communist emblem cut from its centre, flies everywhere, even in place of the Red Star torn from the summit of the War Memorial. Queues, though very long at every food shop open, are orderly; many householders are already clearing away the debris; there is no sign yet of return to work ordered by the Russian Commander, and everyone is ostentatiously ignoring his tank patrols. Soviet armour and guns continue to guard all keypoints.

4. My United States colleague, whom I have just visited, tells me that according to one of his sources, Kadar is trying to persuade Nagy and his lieutenant, Losonczy, to join his “Government”. If true, this represents a step towards realism which must certainly be taken sooner or later, if only because the Kadar “Government” as at present constituted stands no chance of obtaining any degree of willing cooperation from the Hungarian people. But only six days ago Nagy was being called a traitor and obviously the Russians can no longer trust him. While, therefore, I do not doubt that the Hungarian Communists would like to have Nagy back in the fold, I am not sure that the Russians would accept him yet. For the time being, the rumour I think, had better be treated with reserve.